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Book Reviews
Inside the Castle: Law
and Family in 20th
Century America
By Joanna L. Grossman and
Lawrence M. Friedman
Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2011. 443
pages, $35.00.

Reviewed by Michael Ariens
Inside the Castle: Law and Family
in 20th Century America, by Joanna L.
Grossman and Lawrence M. Friedman, is
an entertaining and occasionally frustrating history. In the book’s introduction, the
authors offer two big ideas. Their first
idea promotes the instrumental explanation
of law: “Family law follows family life. ...
Law is not autonomous; it does not evolve
according to some mysterious inner program; it grows and decays and shifts and
fidgets in line with what is happening in
the larger society.” The authors adopt as
well as ignore this idea as they survey what
they accurately and insightfully call their
study of “middle-class family law.” They
distinguish middle-class family law from the
law dealing with poor families, the history of
which studies “the way in which the state, in
exchange for welfare payments, has claimed
and exercised rights to meddle with the
family lives—even sex lives—of poor mothers and other women. ...”
The authors’ second big idea is the
rise in the last part of the 20th century of
what the authors call “individualized marriage,” the successor to “companionate marriage.” Companionate marriage was marriage between two equals, replacing a more
patriarchal form of marriage. Individualized
(or expressive) marriage—terms they
take from the sociologist Andrew Cherlin’s
The Marriage Go-Round (2009)—is “an
intensely individual matter, a road to selfrealization, to personal fulfillment.”
Both these ideas have been long promoted by Lawrence M. Friedman, one
of the nation’s foremost legal historians.
Friedman’s The Republic of Choice: Law,
Authority, and Culture (1990) and The
Horizontal Society (1999) both emphasized the rise of the expressive self in

American history and law. In the earlier
book, he stated that an understanding of
individualism has developed that focuses
on the right “to choose oneself,” one “in
which expression is favored over self-control.” His well-known general histories of
American law, A History of American
Law (3d ed. 2005) and American Law in
the Twentieth Century (2002), reject any
claim of the autonomy of law from society.
Friedman instead argues in the latter book
that “changes in the world bring about, inevitably, corresponding changes in the law.”
These ideas course throughout Inside
the Castle. In many respects, the evidence
adduced by the authors confirms both big
ideas. Grossman and Friedman are persuasive that law has followed culture in the
many varieties of marriage-like relationships. And they persuasively demonstrate
the shift to individualized marriage from
companionate marriage through the 20th
century. By comparison, the authors’ case
that their two big ideas are proven by the
historical events they record is occasionally
weak, but, even so, they take the reader on
an enlightening journey.
Inside the Castle is divided into four
parts: marriage; sex outside of marriage
(which part they title “Anything Goes: Love
and Romance in a Permissive Age”); divorce
and its consequences, including issues of
child custody and support; and relational
duties and rights of family members, from
inheritance and adoption to the rights and
duties of parenthood. This division is largely
successful, though some sections of chapters seem shoe-horned (particularly the
chapter on the rise and fall of “heart balm”
tort claims, a subject given much more coverage than needed, and that seems largely
disconnected from other chapters), and
other sections are summarized too quickly
(particularly the authors’ study of the end
of intra-spousal tort and criminal immunity
for marital rape). Inside the Castle alights
on issues large and small, discussing cases,
statutes, and other material from a large
number of states (though the authors rely
too heavily on the New York Times for
historical exemplars). It provides a wideranging synthesis of the dramatic changes in
family law during the past century.

Two areas in which further development
would have bolstered their overarching
claims are the legal changes to both marital
rape and intra-spousal tort immunity. The
authors spend three pages discussing the
abolition of the “notorious doctrine that
a man could not be guilty of raping his
own wife.” They briefly speak of the wellpublicized 1978 Oregon case in which John
Rideout was accused of raping his wife, as
well as the case of John and Lorena Bobbitt.
They conclude that marital violence may be
a symptom of “modern marriage—companionate or expressive marriage.” This seems
right to me, but I wish that the authors had
pursued more thoroughly any evidence supporting this conclusion. They cite a clipping
service study of prosecutions for marital
rape from 1978 and 1985, and tell us that
there exist “no decent records of marital
rape.” I accept that statement, but wonder
why the authors decided not to attempt to
update the clipping service study, as relying
on a study that ended a quarter-century
before publication of this book is insufficient. In regard to the end of intra-spousal
tort immunity, the authors provide only
the barest outline, concluding that “[m]ost
states have gone this route; but a surprising
number still cling to the original doctrine.”
In a society in which individualized marriage is becoming the norm, the fact that
a “surprising number” of states still bar
tort claims by one spouse against the other
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seems astonishing. Indeed, that brute fact
might suggest that individualized marriage
is not always the touchstone for courts and
legislatures. And if family law follows family
life, why hasn’t intra-spousal tort immunity
been abolished by all (or nearly all) states?
The small section on marital rape also
offers an example of a constant if minor
irritation in the book. The authors provide plenty of anecdotes, but it is unclear
whether these are telling anecdotes or are
merely entertaining. The lurid details of
the case of John and Lorena Bobbitt generated weeks of jokes for late night talk show
hosts, but such events fail to provide a
platform for understanding the transformation of family law in the 20th century. A
similar anecdote is found in the chapter on
the demise of “heart balm” claims, such as
breach of promise to marry and alienation
of affection. The authors tell the story of the
“filthy rich” John Bernard Manning, then 84,
defendant in a suit brought by 29-year-old
Honora O’Brien in 1917. The jury found that
Manning had breached his promise to marry
O’Brien, and awarded her the munificent
sum of $200,000. The New York appeals
court reduced the award to $125,000, and
determined that she could recover damages
even if her decision to marry was based on
“mercenary motives.” Although interesting,
the story of Manning and O’Brien seems to
tell us little, for the paragraph following that
story recites other instances in which such
suits were dismissed.
Another constant though minor irritation
is the recurrent discussion of how “traditional gender roles” required that “[w]ives
were supposed to be chaste, loyal homemakers.” The authors join this trope with
occasional references to Victorian morals,
but they do not cite court decisions or other
authorities reflecting these views, and it
appears that they insert such statements in
order to make changes in family law appear
more transformative than one might otherwise believe they are.
Grossman and Friedman thoroughly and
convincingly trace the history of divorce
law, including the rise of collusive divorces and the reason that many made trips
to Nevada. (Here, the anecdote involving
Eddie Fisher’s divorce of his wife Debbie
Reynolds in order to marry Elizabeth Taylor
is both entertaining and telling.) They also
note that, by the middle of the 20th century,
“a kind of creeping no-fault system began
to emerge,” and they give New Mexico
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credit for first adding “incompatibility” as a
ground for divorce in 1933. But did divorce
law change for reasons having to do with
either the emergent expressive marriage or
because law follows culture? I’m not sure
that the authors have made either case. In
Texas, the only place whose divorce law
reform I have studied, lawyers were at the
forefront in urging the legislature to change
the law, for law reformers believed that the
integrity of the legal system was at stake,
given the prevalence of perjury and artificial
technicalities in the law of divorce. One midcentury study indicated that 85 percent of
divorces in Texas were given on grounds of
cruelty, well above the national average of
55 percent. This interest by lawyers in the
integrity of the legal system was one driving
factor in the 1969 statute allowing Texans
to divorce for the no-fault reason that the
marriage was insupportable, as well as to
divorce for reasons based on fault. The other
reason driving the reform of Texas divorce
law was instrumental: Women were gaining
new legal powers in Texas community property law in the mid-1960s, and divorce law
reformers framed marriage more starkly as a
partnership requiring equitable distribution
of assets in cases of dissolution. The story
of divorce reform in Texas suggests that the
law may, on some occasions, be autonomous
from society.
A section titled “Education and Religion”
discusses the rise of compulsory education
laws, which gave states more control over
children as against parents. That section
briefly discusses the rise of home schooling, but this brevity short-circuits a possibly
fruitful line of inquiry, namely changes to
the triadic relationship of parent, child, and
state over the course of the 20th century.
Compulsory education laws were a favorite
of early-20th century progressives. Oregon
tried to take such laws to another level
by prohibiting private schools, an effort
rejected by the Supreme Court in Pierce
v. Society of Sisters (1925). But many
states made mandatory the education of
children in either private or public schools.
Compulsory education may cleave parental
authority, and allow (or encourage) a child
to form his or her own self, even if that self
is contrary to the person whom parents wish
to raise. In an age of expressive individualism, how did parents manage to transform
compulsory education laws so dramatically
between 1980 and the early 21st century?
Around 1980, some parents who taught

their children at home were prosecuted for
violating compulsory education laws, and
most states either outlawed or barely tolerated home schooling, sometimes requiring
parents to prove their teaching credentials
to teach their children at home, or requiring
children to pass standardized tests if parents wanted to continue schooling at home.
But today, as the authors note, “[a]s many as
4 percent of children nationwide are home
schooled.” Is the triumph of home schooling
consistent with expressive individualism?
It seemed to arise at the same time (the
1970s) as other trends that focused on
expressive individualism, but home schooling reflects less the fear of another person
who may impinge on one’s “self-realization”
than a fear of the totalizing state. It may
suggest the value of families as civic entities
that provide a buffer between the individual
and the state.
As a historical study of 20th-century
family law, Inside the Castle properly
abjures any predictions, noting that “there is
no ending. … The story of life goes on, into
the void. And so too the story of the law.” 
Michael Ariens is a professor of law at St.
Mary’s University in San Antonio, Texas,
where he teaches American legal history,
constitutional law, evidence, and other
courses. He is the author of Lone Star
Law: A Legal History of Texas (2011) and
other books.

Mapping the Nation:
History and Cartography
in Nineteenth-Century
America
By Susan Schulten
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 2012. 246
pages, $45.00.

Reviewed by Henry S. Cohn
University of Denver history professor
Susan Schulten points out that, in the 21st
century, the term “map” often refers to
a “thematic” rather than a “directional”
document. For example, we speak today of
“mapping” the genome or the human brain
(last April, President Obama announced a
project to do the latter). Schulten’s excellent book, Mapping the Nation, seeks the
19th-century roots of today’s maps, which
have moved away from mere cartography.

